Hugh J. Hatch and Ardean Hatch v. Stephen Adams, Sarah Adams and Earl Adams : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1957
Hugh J. Hatch and Ardean Hatch v. Stephen
Adams, Sarah Adams and Earl Adams : Brief of
Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ralph & Bushnell; Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation




JJN.IVERS1TY UT A.H 
NOV 1 1957 
LAW UL:lhi~V 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah. , I J~ L E l 
· IIJL 2 2 1S57 
HUGH J. HATCH and ARDEA:~~:::~--·c;,~;i:-·s·~-;;~;-;;,;··o;·~-;{]i;r 
Case 
vs. 
I No. 8644 STEPHEN ADAMS, SARAH ADAMS and EARL ADAMS, Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
RALPH & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------------- 3 
STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------------- 7 
ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
POINT ONE: THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY 
SUSTAINS THE FACT THAT THE WATER IN 
QUESTION WAS APPURTENANT TO THE LAND 
CONVEYED AND THAT IT WAS IN FACT CON-
VEYED WITH THE LAND. -------------------------------------------- 7 
POINT TWO: PAROL EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN RECEIVED TO DETERMINE THE INTEN-
TIONS OF THE PARTIES AS TO APPURTENANT 
WATER. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 13 
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 16 
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 
68 A.L.R. 15 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
70 A.L.R. 75 3 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
93 C.J.S. 1070 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
P .C.A. 195 3, 73-1-1 o ---------------------------------------------------------- 8, 14 
Bank of British North American v. Miller, C.C., 6 F. 
545, 5 50 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the land and thus part of the deal, was never delivered to him; 
and he commenced this action to recover these shares. This 
appeal is taken upon a ruling by the trial court excluding parol 
evidence which was introduced by the plaintiff to show that the 
water in question was appurtenant to the land. 
The defendant listed his farm and home with a real 
estate agency, and it was placed on the multiple listing. The 
listing agreement stated that the price would be $22,000 and 
that the water rights were "extra good, plenty water" (Exhibit 
1-A) . Plaintiff contacted a real estate agent and was shown 
the property. Upon talking with the defendant, the price was 
raised to $23,500; and on March 29, 1951, an earnest money 
receipt was signed calling for a sale of the property with all 
water rights "appertaining" thereto (Exhibit 1-B). On April 
7, 1951, the parties signed a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
calling for the sale of the same property with the same water 
rights, and on the same day an escrow agreement was entered 
into wherein there was placed in a bank the deed to the property, 
together with a number of shares of water stock. The water 
stock in question was not included in the escrow (Exhibits 
1-D, 1-E). 
At the trial, the following evidence was introduced to 
prove that the water in question was appurtenant to the land: 
1. The defendant (grantor) received the water in question 
at the time he received a deed to the property, and to his knowl-
edge the water had been used on the land sirn:e 1926. He per-
sonally had used it on the land in question from the time he 
obtained the property ( 1950) until he conveyed the property 
to the plaintiff (R. 109, 110). 
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2. The watermaster for the water companies testified that 
this water had been used on this land since about 1917 (R. 68). 
Fur~hermore, the watermaster gave his opinion that without 
the water in question the land had only a "fair" water right, 
but with this particular water it had a "good" water right (R. 
71). 
3. The plaintiff used the water for two years, at which 
time the defendant alleged it was not part of the transaction and 
the water was cut off. Without this water, there was not enough 
water to adequately grow crops on the land (R. 21-23). 
4. The plaintiff used the seven and one-half shares m 
question and paid the assessments thereon for the years 1952 
and 1953 (R. 11, 12). 
5. Other water, represented by stock, which had been used 
on the land passed to the plaintiff pursuant to the general lan-
guage of the contract (Exhibit 1-E). 
The plaintiff introduced the following evidence concerning 
the intention of the parties, subject to the objection that such 
introduction violated the parol evidence rule. The objection 
was subsequently sustained and the evidence stricken. 
1. Testimony of the plaintiff that during the discussions 
prior to the signing of the contract the defendant stated that 
the seven and one-half shares of Provo water in question were 
to be sold with the property (R. 6, 7}. 
2. A written record which the plaintiff had made at the 
time of these negotiations which lists the Provo water amon,~ 
the water shares to be transferred (R. 7 and Exhibit 1-L). 
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3. That the initial asking price for the property, whic 
was $22,000, was raised to $23,500 because the defendant sai 
it was worth J1,500 more with full water rights (R. 8, 9 
(R. 84). 
4. When the deeds and stock were placed in escrow, th 
defendant said he could not find the seven and one-half shan 
of Provo stock, but that he would bring them in. The repn 
sentative of the bank, in front of all parties, said to the plaintifl 
··you don't need to worry-it (the additional seven and om 
half shares) will be brought in-he (the defendant) is an f}j 
bishop" (R. 11). The real estate agent affirmed that this wa 
the conversation that took place (R. 88, 89). 
5. The real estate agent had made a worksheet at th 
time of the transaction, showing the exact shares to be sol~ 
with the property as dictated by the defendant. The seven an~ 
one-half shares in question were listed on this workshee 
(Exhibit 1-C, and R. 85, 86, 98). The real estate agent ha~ 
copied the number of shares to go with the transaction, includ 
ing the seven and one-half shares in question, on the back o 
the listing agreement during the preliminary negotiation (fu 
hibit 1-A and R. 97). 
6. The defendant told the listing agent there was plent 
of water (R. 119). 
In its minute entries, the court held that ( 1) testimon 
of preliminary negotiations should be stricken because of th 
parol evidence rule, and ( 2) the real estate purchase contract i 
not ambiguous. 
It is submitted to this court on appeal that, if the real estat 
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contract is not ambiguous, then it is clear that the water in 
question was appurtenant to the land, as was other water 
represented by shares of stock which passed to the plaintiff 
in tLc transaction. It is further submitted that, since the contract 
purported to transfer all appurtenant water, the parol evidence 
which was introduced as to the intent of the parties clearly 
establishes that the water was to be transferred with the land 
and that it was appurtenant. By either alternative the trial 
court erred in awarding the water to the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE: THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SUS-
TAINS THE FACT THAT THE WATER H.J QUESTIOI,~ 
WAS APPURTENANT TO THE LAND CONVEYED AND 
THAT IT WAS IN FACT CONVEYED WITH THE LAND. 
POINT TWO: PAROL EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN RECEIVED TO DETERMINE THE INTENTIONS 
OF THE PARTIES AS TO APPURTENANT WATER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SUSTAINS THE 
fACT THAT THE WATER IN QUESTION WAS APPUR-
TENANT TO THE LAND CONVEYED AND THAT IT 
WAS IN FACT CONVEYED WITH THE LAND. 
"It has long been the law in this state that water 
rights, even though appurtenant to certain land, may 
be separately conveyed from that land." Salt Lake City 
v. McFarland, et ux, Utah, 1954, 265 P. 2d 626. 
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The legislature of this state has attempted to further 
clarify this proposition with the following statute: 
"Water rights shall be transferred by deed in sub-
stantially the same manner as real estate, except when 
they are represented by shares of stock in a corporation, 
in which case water shall not be deemed to be appurten-
ant to the land ... " 73-1-10, U.C.A., 1953. 
This court, in the case of Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking 
Co., 2 Utah 2d 93, 269 P. 2d 859, has said that the effect of this 
statute: 
" ... was to establish a rebuttable presumption that 
a water right represented by shares of stock in a cor-
poration did not pass to the grantee as an appurtenance 
to the land upon which the water right was used, but 
that the grantee could overcome such presumption if 
he could show by clear and convincing evidence that 
said water right was in fact appurtenant and that the 
grantor intended to transfer the water right with the 
land, even though no express mention of any water 
right was made in the deed ... 
"In other words, the 1943 amendment merely obvi-
ated the necessity for a grantor, who owned a water 
right represented by shares of stock in a corporation 
but who did not desire to transfer that water right to 
the grantee of the land upon which the water was being 
used, to make an express reservation of that water 
right in the deed. But the amendment does not foreclose 
the water right from passing if the grantee can show 
such was the intention of the grantor . .. (Italics added.) 
In the Brimm case, supra, the court found (1) The water 
had been used to irrigate the land since 1890, (2) the land 
had little value without the water, and ( 3) the decree of 
distribution contained the words .. together with water right 
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appurtenant thereto." Based upon these findings, the court 
held that the grantee had paid the grantors for the land on the 
basis that the water went with the land. 
Essentially the same facts are presented in this case as in 
the Brimm case. ( 1) The water has been used to irrigate the 
land since about 1917 (R. 68); (2) The land is of little value 
without the water (R. 21-23); and (3) The contract con-
veyed the land with "all water rights appurtenant thereto." 
As an additional fact, the price was raised from $22,000 to 
$23,500 because of the good water rights (R. 8, 9, 84). Under 
these facts in this case, it should follow that the water \vas 
appurtenant to the land and it was the intention of the grantor 
defendant to convey these rights. In fact, this case represents 
a stronger case in favor of conveyance of this water. In the 
Brimm case there was no language in the contract which indi-
cated that it was the intent of the parties to specifically convey 
all the water rights appurtenant to the land. In this case the 
language in the contract precisely establishes this to be the intent 
of the parties. 
Numerous cases support this vtew. In the case of Dill 
et al v. Killip et al., Oregon, 1944, 147 P. 2d 896, the only 
mention of water rights in the deed was the phrasing ''with 
the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances." After the 
transfer of the property, the dispute arose between the grantor 
and grantee as to whether or not certain water rights had been 
transferred. Quoting from Wiel's Water Rights in the Western 
States} the court said: 
"It is well settled that a water-right may pass with 
land as an appurtenance thereto, or as a parcel thereof, 
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but not necessarily so; and wbether a water right passes 
as an appurtenance involves two questions, viz: (a) 
Whether the water-right is an appurtenance, and (b) 
whether, being such, it was intended to pass. Both of 
these are questions of fact in each case. 
"The first question, whether the water-right is an 
appurtenance, depends on whether it is an incident, 
necessary to the enjoyment of the land. The water-
right is not necessarily appurtenant to or parcel of 
any land; and whether it is an appurtenance or parcel 
is a question of fact resting chiefly upon whether it 
was used specially for the benefit of the land in ques-
tion . . . A water right is incidental or appurtenant to 
land when by right used with the land for its benefit." 
(Italics added.) 
Quoting from Bank of British North America v. Miller, C. C., 
6 F. 545, 550, the court went on to say: 
"It is also clear that a sale of any real property carries 
with it any easement or privilege which is necessary to 
its enjoyment, and at the time is in use thereon and 
therewith, as an appurtenance in fact,_ although not 
technically so at law, and this upon the presumption, 
more or less cogent according to the circumstances, that 
it was the intention of the parties to the agreement of 
sale that it should pass with the property to which it 
was then apparently subservient. 
"In such a case the question is simply as to the inten-
tion of the parties to be gathered from the terms of 
the conveyance, the subject matter, and its use and 
situation at the time of the sale, or as was said by Mr. 
Justice Story in United States v. Appleton, rln the con-
struction of grants the court ought to take into consid-
eration the circumstances attendant upon the tt'ans-
action, the particular situation of the parties, the state 
of the country, and the state of the thing granted, for 
the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the pat'ties. 
10 
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In truth, every grant of a thing naturally and necessarily 
imports a grant of it as it actually exists, unless the 
contrary is provided for.' " (Italics added.) 
In the case of James v. Barker et al., Colo., 193 7, 64 P. 2d 598, 
where an almost identical situation existed, a deed purported 
to convey some water rights with the usual "together with all 
and singular the privileges and appurtenances thereunto be-
longing" clause. Numerous water rights had been used on the 
land. Where the dispute concerned whether or not certain 
shares of water stock were part of the conveyance, the court 
said: 
"The evidence tends to show that the land on which 
the deed of trust for $15,000 was given, if only the 
water right from the Colorado Canal was included, 
would be worth from $10 to $125 per acre. There was 
over $24,000 due on the indebtedness at the time of 
the foreclosure. 
"Are these water rights, represented by the stock in 
the reservoir companies, appurtenances to the land 
involved in the foreclosure, and were they conveyed 
by the trustee's deed? The answer is the decision of 
this case. Plaintiff argues that they are not, that they 
may be conveyed independently of the land; further, 
that they were pledged for use only in the event of a 
deficiency at sale of the land and water rights de-
scribed in the deed. Defendants contend that they are 
appurtenances to the land covered by the deed of trust; 
that they are necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the 
land; that the land did not have practical value for 
agricultural purposes without them; that the value of 
the land with these supplemental water rights approxi-
mated the bid at the trustee's sale, and that it may be 
presumed from the circumstances existing at the time 
the deed of trust was given, that all these rights were 
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"That all of the water rights involved were at all 
times used on the land does not seem to be questioned. 
That they were indispensable to give to the land the 
value necessary to secure the amount of the loan made 
is not seriously in doubt. That they were considered to 
be included in the transaction conveyance would logical-
ly induce the bid as made at the sale. That water rights 
are sometimes conveyed by a deed to land that is silent 
on the subject is settled law. A water right used, as 
here, for the irrigation of land, will pass under the 
appurtenance clause in a conveyance of land, without 
a specific mention in the deed, if the presumptions 
arising from the circumstances of the transaction make 
it appear that it was the intention of the grantor that 
it should so pass." (Italics added.) 
A very recent Nevada case illustrates the jealous nature of 
appurtenant water: 
"The water and the land to which it is applied be-
come so interrelated and dependent on each other in 
order to constitute a valid appropriation that the former 
becomes by reason of necessity appurtenant to the 
latter. Such would appear to be the universally recog-
nized laws of waters in the arid western states." Zolezzi 
v. Jackson, Nevada, 1956, 297 P. 2d 1081. 
This court has also emphasized the adherence of water to land: 
rrshares of stock of an irrigation company issued in 
place of the vested water right for lands in an irrigation 
district are appurtenant unless they have been trans-
ferred and put to a beneficial use upon other lands." 
Milford State Bank v. West Field Canal and Irrigation 
Company, et al., Utah, 1945, 162 P. 2d 101. Ibid. 
For further authorities supporting the above proposition see 
Gillespie Land and Irrigation Company v. Buckeye Irrigation 
Co., et al., Arizona, 1953, 257 P. 2d 393; New River Mineral 
12 
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Co. v. Painter, Virginia, 1902, 42 S. E. 300; Shire v. Kammers 
State Bank, 112 Kan. 690, 213 P. 159; 70 A.L.R. 753; 93 
C.J.S. page 1070. 
POINT TWO 
PAROL EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN RE-
CEIVED TO DETERMINE THE INTENTIONS OF THE 
PARTIES AS TO APPURTENANT WATER. 
In this case the contract which the parties signed called 
for the conveyance of the land "together with all buildings 
and improvements thereon and all water rights appurtenant 
thereto" (Exhibit 1-D). No mention was made as to the pre-
cise shares of water that were to be conveyed. 
Regarding the parol evidence rule, this court has held: 
"The rule is founded upon the principle that when 
the parties have discussed and agreed upon their obli-
gations to each other, and reduced those terms to writ-
ing, that such terms if clear and unambiguous, furnish 
better and more definite evidence of what was under-
taken by each party than the too often fickle memory 
of man, for what else reduce it to writing." Garrett v. 
Ellison, 93 U. 184, 72 P. 2d 449. (Italics added.) 
It is the general rule that where the contract is vague, 
uncertain or indefinite as to the identity of the property intended 
to be conveyed, parol evidence is admissible to give effect to the 
intention of the parties to the instrument. Such evidence is 
not to vary or contradict the language of the writing, but it 
ts to make clear that which was uncertain so far as this is 
possible without aiding material terms to the writing. 68 
1:3 
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A.L.R. 15. See also, Joerger v. Pacific Gas and Electric, Cali-
fornia, 1929, 276 P. 1017, Williamson v. Pratt, California, 
1918, 174 P. 114, and Thompson v. McKenna, California, 
1913, 133 P. 512. As has been argued in Point One, the intention 
of the parties in these kinds of cases is all important. For this 
reason the problem presented in this case as to whether or 
not it was intended that certain shares of water stock should 
be conveyed with the land where the usual "all water rights 
appurtenant thereto" clause has been used, clearly illustrates 
this exception to the parol evidence rule. 
In the case of Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co., supra, 
this court held that the Utah statute regarding the passing of 
shares of water stock with the land (73-1-10) "was to estab-
li.:..h a rebuttable presumption that a water right represented 
by shares of stock in a corporation did not pass to the grantee 
as an appurtenance ... but the grantee could overcome such 
presumption if he could show by clear and convincing evidence 
that said water right was in fact appurtenant and that the 
grantor intended to transfer the water right with the land." 
There is no way that this plaintiff could rebut this presumption 
without introducing parol evidence to establish the intent of 
the parties. The trial court was in error when it refused to 
allow such evidence. 
In the case of Dill, et al., v. Killip, et al., Ore. 1944, 147 
P. 2d 896, where precisely the same problem was presented, 
the court emphasized the importance of the intent of the 
parties with the following language: 
"In such a case tbe question is simply as to the inten-
tion of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the 
conveyance, the subject matter, and its use and situation 
14 
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at the time of the sale, or as was said by Mr. Justice 
Story in United States v. Appleton, 'In the construction 
of grants the court ought to take into consideration the 
circumstances attendant upon the transaction, the par-
ticular situation of the parties, the state of the country, 
and the state of the thing granted, for the purpose of 
ascertaining the intention of the parties." (Italics 
added.) 
In an action based on a contract which was indefinite, the 
Arizona court said: 
"The court had the right to receive the evidence 
concerning the conditions existing at the time the con-
tract was executed and the oral evidence showing the 
intention of the parties . ... The terms of the contract 
are thus rendered sufficiently definite ... " Colmenero 
Canal Co. v. Babers, Arizona 1956, 297 P. 2d 927. 
(Italics added.) 
In Brown v. Warren, 1881, 16 Nevada 228, where a general 
description of "all the real estate, water rights, and property 
of every description, real and personal, in the State of Nevada 
belonging to the parties of the first" was used in a convey-
ance, parol evidence was held admissible to enable an identi-
fication of the property even though the deed was not am-
biguous. 
The Colorado court has affirmed this view in the follow-
ing language: 
"A water right used, as here, for the irrigation of 
land, will pass under the appurtenance clause in a 
conveyance of land, without a specific mention in the 
deed, if the presumption arising from the circumstances 
of the transaction make it appear that it was the inten-
tion of the grantor that it should so pass." James v. 
Barker, 99 Colo. 551, 64 P. 2d 598. (Italics added.) 
15 
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This court has outlined the parol evidence question in the 
following manner: 
. "If the ambiguity can be reconciled from a reason-
able interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence 
should not be allowed. If the instrument or its fact 
remains ambiguous in spite of the reasonable construc-
tion, the intent may be ascertained in the light of all 
written instruments which were a part of the same 
transaction. If the intent is ambiguous still, then parol 
evidence may be admitted, and rules of construction 
may be invoked to declare the intention of the parties." 
Continental Bank v. Bybee, 1957, 306 P. 2d 773. 
It was necessary to introduce parol evidence to establish 
just what the defendant intended to convey (R. 116). From 
the cases already cited, it seems that the word "appurtenant" 
1s not ambiguous; however, the defendant himself used parol 
evidence to attempt to show his intention (R. 102, 107, 116). 
If it is believed that parol evidence is necessary in this case, 
it is submitted that the weight of the evidence as to the intention 
of the parties clearly establishes that the seven and one-half 
shares of water in question were to be conveyed with the 
property. 
CONCLUSION 
The parol evidence and an abundance of other evidence 
which was presented in this case clearly indicates that the water 
in question was appurtenant to the land conveyed and that 
it was the intention of the parties to convey this water. The 
courts have universally recognized the uselessness of farm 
land without water, and for this reason it is virtually a pre-
16 
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sumption that once water is appurtenant to the land and the 
land is conveyed with all its appurtenances, the water is con-
veyed also. These are precisely the facts of this case. In the face 
of such explicit protection of water rights, the defendant 
has not satisfied his burden of proving the water was not trans-
ferred with the land. Even where parol evidence is introduced 
by both sides, the facts are conclusively in favor of the plaintiff. 
The Brimm case being controlling under the facts of this 
case, the plaintiff should have been permitted to rebut the 
presumption created by the statute. The trial court, having 
erroneously excluded such extrinsic evidence, was not in a 
position to make a finding that the water was not appurtenant. 
Rather, the evidence so excluded clearly indicates that it was 
appurtenant to the land and that, in fact, it was the intent 
of the parties that it should be conveyed to the plaintiff. 
For these reasons the holding of the trial court should 
be reversed, with instructions to assess the damages suffered 
by the plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RALPH & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
17 
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